This lecture is mainly based the following textbooks:
Study review and practice: I strongly recommend using Prof. Henrique Castro (FGV-EAESP) materials. Below you can find the links to the corresponding exercises related to this lecture:
\(\rightarrow\) For coding replications, whenever applicable, please follow this page or hover on the specific slides with coding chunks.
In our previous lecture, we saw the how the Modigliani and Miller propositions played a key role in explaining capital structure decisions:
In perfect capital markets, the total value of a firm’s securities is equal to the market value of the total cash flows generated and is not affected by its choice of capital structure
Moreover, the cost of capital of levered equity increases with the firm’s market value debt equity ratio:
\[ \small r_E=r_U+\dfrac{D}{E}(r_U-r_D) \]
\(\rightarrow\) As a consequence, the weighted average cost of capital, WACC, should not be affected by the mix of debt and equity!
You may well think…but we are not in a perfect capital market, so why should I bother? That goes hand in hand with the Modigliani and Miller findings:
Knowing how these imperfections affect the firm value is important for business and policy considerations
Question: if capital structure does not matter, why is debt so abundant?
The statement that capital structure decisions are irrelevant for the value of a firm are difficult to reconcile with the observation that firms invest significant resources, both in terms of managerial time and effort and investment banking fees, in managing their capital structures
In many instances, the choice of leverage is of critical importance to a firm’s value and future success:
\(\rightarrow\) Therefore, if capital structure does matter, then it must stem from a market imperfection!
With Leverage | Without Leverage | |
---|---|---|
EBIT | $2,800 | $2,800 |
Interest Expenses | -$400 | $0 |
Income before tax | $2,400 | $2,800 |
Taxes (35%) | -$840 | -$980 |
Net income | $1,560 | $1,820 |
\[ \small \underbrace{980}_{\text{Int. Expenses w/o Leverage}} - \underbrace{840}_{\text{Int. Expenses w/ Leverage}} = \underbrace{140}_{\text{Interest Tax-Shield}} \]
\[ \small \text{Tax-Shield}= \tau \times \text{Interest Payments} \rightarrow 35\% \times 400 = 140 \]
When a firm uses debt, the interest tax shield provides a corporate tax benefit each and every year when interest payments are computed:
It is if the firm was receiving an extra cash flow each year, and this will be used to pay down investors (debtholders + shareholders)
This benefit is then computed as the present value of the stream of future interest tax shields the firm will receive
As a consequence, the value of the firm, when calculated on the basis of the discounted future cash-flows, will increase due to leverage! Formally, we can reframe our Modigliani-Miller Proposition I in the presence of with taxes: the total value of the levered firm exceeds the value of the firm without leverage due to the present value of the tax savings from debt:
\[ \small \underbrace{V^L}_{\text{Value of Levered Firm}} = \underbrace{V^U}_{\text{Value of Unlevered Firm (all-equity)}} + \underbrace{PV(ITS)}_{\text{Value of Tax-Shields}} \]
\(\rightarrow\) By increasing the cash flows paid to debt holders through interest payments, a firm reduces the amount paid in taxes!
Suppose ALCO plans to pay 60 million in interest each year for the next eight years, and then repay the principal of 1 billion in year 8. These payments are risk free, and ALCO’s marginal tax rate will remain 39% throughout this period. If the risk-free interest rate is 6%, by how much does the interest tax shield increase the value of ALCO?
\(\rightarrow\) Solution: The annual interest tax shield that is accrued to the firm in from years 1 to 8 is:
\[ \small 1\text{ billion}\times 6\% \times 39\% = 23.4\text{ million} \]
\[ \small PV(ITS) = \frac{23,4}{(1+6\%)^1} + \frac{23,4}{(1+6\%)^2}+. . . + \frac{23,4}{(1+6\%)^8} = 145.31 \text{ million} \]
When analyzing levered firms, one may think about several debt dynamics that can occurs. Typically, the level of future interest payments is uncertain due to factors such as:
Question: how can we value the interest tax-shield when taking these nuances in consideration? For simplicity, we’ll start by considering the special case in which the above variables are kept constant. This is reasonable because:
\[ \small PV(ITS) = \frac{\tau_c \times \text{Int. Expenses}}{r_f} = \frac{\tau_c \times (r_f \times D)}{r_f} = \tau_c \times D \]
You may wonder from where the increased value of the levered firm (\(\small V^L > V^U\)) came from
It is easy to see that when a firm uses debt financing, the cost of the interest it must pay is offset to some extent by the tax savings from the interest tax shield. Assuming a marginal tax-rate of \(\small \tau_c = 21\%\) and a permanent level of debt \(\small D = 100,000\), at \(\small10\%\) percent interest per year:
Interest expense | $10,000 |
Tax savings | - $2,100 |
After-tax cost of debt | $7,900 |
\[ \small \underbrace{r_d}_{\text{Cost of Debt}} \times \underbrace{(1-\tau_c)}_{\text{Tax-Shield Factor}}\rightarrow 10\%\times(1-21\%)=7.9\% \]
\[\small r_{WACC} = \frac{E}{E+D} \times r_e + \frac{D}{E+D} \times r_d \times (1-\tau_c)\]
\[ \small r_{WACC} = \underbrace{\frac{E}{E+D} \times r_e + \frac{D}{E+D} \times r_d}_{\text{pre-tax WACC}} \underbrace{-\frac{D}{E+D} \times r_d \times \tau_c}_{\text{Reduction due to Interest Tax-Shield}} \]
\[ \small \underbrace{V^L}_{\text{Value of Levered Firm}} = \underbrace{V^U}_{\text{Value of Unlevered Firm (all-equity)}} + \underbrace{PV(ITS)}_{\text{Value of Tax-Shields}} \]
Harris Solutions expects to have free cash flow in the coming year of \(\small \$1.75\) million, and its free cash flow is expected to grow at a rate of \(\small 3.5\%\) per year thereafter. Harris Solutions has an equity cost of capital of \(\small 12\%\) and a debt cost of capital of \(\small7\%\), and it pays a corporate tax rate of \(\small 40\%\). If Harris Solutions maintains a debt-equity ratio of \(\small2.5\), what is the value of its interest tax shield?
\(\rightarrow\) Solution: First, compute pre-tax WACC and \(\small V^U\):
\[ \small \text{WACC}_{\text{Pre-Tax}}=\small \frac{E}{E+D} \times r_e + \frac{D}{E+D} \times r_d = \frac{1}{1+2.5} \times 12\% + \frac{2.5}{1+2.5} \times 7\% = 8.43\% \]
\[ \small V^U = \frac{1.75}{8.43\% - 3.5\%} = 35.50 \text{ million} \]
\[ \small \text{WACC}_{\text{After-Tax}}=\frac{1}{1+2.5} \times 12\% + \frac{2.5}{1+2.5} \times 7\% \times (1-40\%) = 6.43\% \]
\[ \small V^L = \frac{1.75}{6.43\% - 3.5\%} = 59.73 \text{ million} \]
\[ \small V^L - V^U = 59.73 - 35.50 = 24.23 \text{ million} \]
When a firm makes a significant change to its capital structure, the transaction is called a recapitalization (or simply a “recap”)
For example, in a leveraged recapitalization, a firm issues a large amount of debt and uses the proceeds to pay a special dividend or to repurchase shares
As we’ll see in the next example, the answer is yes: when we alter the amount of taxes due, the current shareholders of the firm benefit from this change!
Assume that Midco Industries wants to boost its stock price. The company currently has \(\small 20\) million shares outstanding with a market price of \(\small \$15\) per share and no debt. Midco has had consistently stable earnings and pays a \(\small 21\%\) tax rate. Management plans to borrow \(\small \$100\) million on a permanent basis, and they will use the borrowed funds to repurchase outstanding shares.
Their expectation is that the tax savings from this transaction will boost Midco’s stock price and benefit shareholders
Question: is this this expectation realistic?
\[ \small V^U = 20,000,000 \times 15 = 300 \text{ million} \]
\[ \small \tau_c \times D = 21\% \times 100 \text{ million} = 21 \text{ million} \]
\[ \small V^L=V^U+PV(ITS)\rightarrow 300+21= 321 \text{ million} \]
\[ \small 321 - 100 = 221 \text{ million} \]
Although the value of the shares outstanding drops from to \(\small \$300\) to \(\small\$ 221\) million, shareholders will also receive \(\small \$100\) million that Midco Industries will pay out through the share repurchases
In total, they will receive the full \(\small \$321\) million, a gain of \(\small \$21\) million over the value of their shares without leverage!
That is, the firm has the incentive to make such recapitalization
\[ \small 20- 6.67= 13.33 \text{ million shares outstanding} \]
\[ \small \frac{221}{13.33} = 16.575 \]
\[ \small (\underbrace{16.575}_{\text{New Price}} - \underbrace{15}_{\text{Prev. Price}}) = \underbrace{1.575}_{\text{Capital Gain}} \times \underbrace{13.33}_{\text{Million Shares}} = 21 \text{ million} \]
In the previous case, the shareholders who remain after the recap receive the benefit of the tax-shield
However, you may have noticed something odd in the previous calculations…
We assumed that Midco Industries was able to repurchase the shares at the initial price of \(\small \$15\) per share, and then demonstrated that the shares would be worth $16.575 after the transaction
But if the shares are worth \(\small \$16.575\) after the repurchase, why would shareholders tender their shares to Midco at \(\small \$15\) per share?
In theory, this represents an Arbitrage Opportunity: if investors could buy shares for \(\small \$15\) immediately before the repurchase and sell these shares immediately after at a higher price, this would represent a gain without any risks!
In practice, the value of the Midco Industries equity will rise immediately, from \(\small \$300\) million to \(\small \$321\) million, right after the repurchase announcement. In other words, the stock price will rise from \(\small \$15 \rightarrow \$16.05\) immediately!
With \(\small 20\) million shares outstanding, the share price will rise to: \(\small \$321/20=\$16.05\)
In other words, Midco Industries must offer at least this price to repurchase the shares, leading to a profit of \(\small \$16.05-\$15=\$1.05\) to shareholders who sell at this price
Note that all shareholders benefit from this policy: both shareholders who tender their shares and the shareholders who hold their shares both are better-off!
With a repurchase price of \(\small \$16.05\), both shareholders who tender their shares and the ones who hold their shares both gain \(\small \$16.05 − \$15 = \$1.05\) per share as a result of the transaction
The benefit of the interest tax shield goes to all \(\small 20\) million shares outstanding for a total benefit of:
\[ \small \underbrace{1.05}_{\text{Gain per share}}\times \underbrace{20}_{\text{Shares Outstanding}} = \underbrace{21 \text{ million}}_{\text{Interest Tax-Shield}} \]
\(\rightarrow\) When securities are fairly priced, the original shareholders of a firm capture the full benefit of the interest tax shield from an increase in leverage!
\(\rightarrow\) See (Berk and DeMarzo 2023), page 566, for a more comprehensible simulation for different values of tender prices
Assume that a firm maintains a debt-equity ratio of \(\small0.85\), and has an equity cost of capital of \(\small12\%\), and a debt cost of capital of \(\small7\%\). The applicable corporate tax rate is \(\small25\%\), and its market capitalization is \(\small\$220\) million. If the firms’ free cash flow is expected to be \(\small\$10\) million in one year, what constant expected future growth rate is consistent with the firm’s current market value?
\(\rightarrow\) Solution: first, we calculate the WACC as:
\[ \small \text{WACC}= \dfrac{1}{1+0.85}\times 12\% + \dfrac{0.85}{1+0.85}\times 7\% \times (1-25\%)=8.90\% \]
Note that \(\small V^L=E+D\). If the market capitalization is \(\small 220\), then \(\small D = E\times 0.85=187\). Therefore, the firm value can be estimated in terms of a growing perpetuity:
\[ \small V^L=\dfrac{FC}{r-g}= (220+187)=\dfrac{10}{8.90\%-g}\rightarrow g \approx 6.44\% \]
Based on the previous exercise, estimate the value of firm’s interest tax shield.
\(\rightarrow\) Solution: first, we calculate the pre-tax WACC (or \(\small r_U\)) as:
\[ \small \text{pre-tax WACC}= \dfrac{1}{1+0.85}\times 12\% + \dfrac{0.85}{1+0.85}\times 7\%=9.70\% \]
Remember that you can find the value of unlevered equity (\(\small V^U\)) by discounting using the unlevered cost of capital (or pre-tax WACC):
\[ \small V^U=\dfrac{10}{9,7\%-6.44\%}= 307 \] Therefore, the present value of the interest tax shield is simply the difference between the levered and unlevered equity:
\[ \small PV(ITS)=V^L-V^U\rightarrow 407-307=100 \]
So far, we have looked to the benefits of leverage in the presence of corporate taxes. Although it is correct to say that the firm has a higher cash flow due to tax-shield savings, it is not straightforward to say that shareholders are fully benefiting from such increase
What happens to our conclusions on debt benefits when we account for the effect of personal taxes?
\(\rightarrow\) Since personal taxes have the potential to offset some of the corporate tax benefits of leverage, in order to determine the true tax benefit of leverage, we need to evaluate the combined effect of both corporate and personal taxes!
In the United States and many other countries, interest income has historically been taxed more heavily than capital gains from equity1
To determine the true tax benefit of leverage, we need to evaluate the combined effect of both corporate and personal taxes. In order to see that, consider a firm with \(\small\$1\) of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). The firm has two options:
Depending on the type of investor, tax rates are different:
Payment Due | After-Tax Cash Flows | Using Current Tax Rates |
---|---|---|
To debt holders | \(\small(1 −\tau_i)\) | ( 1 − 0.37 ) = 0.63 |
To equity holders | \(\small(1 − \tau_c)\times(1-\tau_e)\) | (1 − 0.21)( 1 − 0.20 ) = 0.632 |
\[ \small (1-\tau^*) \times (1-\tau_i) = (1-\tau_c)\times(1-\tau_e) \]
\[ \small \tau^* = 1-\frac{(1-\tau_c)\times(1-\tau_e)}{(1-\tau_i)} \]
\[ \small(1-\tau_e) \times (1-\tau_c) = (1-\tau_i) \]
Assume that the corporate tax rate (\(\small \tau_c\)) is \(\small 34\%\), the personal tax rate on equity (\(\small \tau_e\)) is \(\small 28\%\), and the personal tax rate on debt (\(\small \tau_i\)) is also \(\small 28\%\). What is the tax advantage of debt for a firm?
\(\rightarrow\) Solution: using the formula, we have that:
\[ \small \tau^* = 1-\frac{(1-\tau_c)\times(1-\tau_e)}{(1-\tau_i)}\rightarrow 1-\dfrac{(1-34\%)\times(1-28\%)}{(1-28\%)}=34\% \]
In other words, the tax advantage of debt is the corporate tax rate if there is no difference between the tax rate on interest payments or equity
If, for example, equity income is taxed less heavily than interest income, then \(\small \tau^\star\), the tax advantage of debt, will be lower than the corporate tax rate
Consider the stylized Brazilian case and compute the effective tax advantage of debt.
The tax advantage of debt in a Brazilian setting is:
\[ \small \tau^* = 1-\frac{(1-34\%)\times(1-15\%)}{(1-27.5\%)} = 22.6\% \]
\[V^L = V^U + \tau^* \times D\]
MoreLev Inc. currently has a market cap of \(\small\$500\) million with \(\small40\) million shares outstanding. It expects to pay a \(\small 21\%\) corporate tax rate. It estimates that its marginal corporate bondholder pays a \(\small20\%\) tax rate on interest payments, whereas its marginal equity holder pays on average a \(\small10\%\) tax rate on income from dividends and capital gains. MoreLev plans to add permanent debt. Based on this information, estimate the firm’s share price after a \(\small\$220\) million leveraged recap.
\(\rightarrow\) Solution: using the formula for the tax advantage of debt, we have that:
\[ \small \tau^* = 1-\frac{(1-21\%)\times(1-10\%)}{(1-20\%)} = 11.1\% \]
\[ \small \tau^\star\times D \rightarrow 11.1\%\times 220 = 24.4 \text{ million} \]
Note: full picture in (Berk and DeMarzo 2023)
Question: considering all the tax benefits of debt, why is that firms do not use more debt?
\(\rightarrow\) A potential explanation (among other hypotheses) is that there are limits to the tax benefit of debt that makes firm to optimally set a given debt-to-value ratio
When it comes to taxable earnings, there may be limits to how much a firm can deduct interest expenses on its taxable income - in our case, EBIT
For example, in the United States, there is a limit of \(\small 30\%\) of the EBIT for how much can be deducted in taxable income due to interest payments1
Consider a case where EBIT is \(\small \$1,000\) and the corporate tax rate is \(\small 21\%\). In a situation like this, a firm may limit its leverage to achieve the highest interest shield possible from a tax perspective - see Table in the next slide
No Leverage | Moderate Leverage | Excess Leverage | |
---|---|---|---|
EBIT | $1,000 | $1,000 | $1,000 |
Interest Expenses | $0 | $300 | $500 |
30% Limit | $300 | $300 | $300 |
Interest Deduction | $0 | $300 | $300 |
Taxable Income | $1,000 | $700 | $700 |
Taxes (21%) | $210 | $147 | $147 |
Net Income | $790 | $553 | $353 |
Tax Shield | $0 | $63 | $63 |
\(\rightarrow\) The optimal level of leverage from a tax saving perspective is the level such that interest just equals the income limit
How firms could optimally set their leverage from a tax savings perspective? A way to think about it is to relate to its future EBIT (taxable earnings):
\(\rightarrow\) In general, as a firm’s interest expense approaches its expected taxable earnings, the marginal tax advantage of debt declines, limiting the amount of debt the firm should use
\(\rightarrow\) It seems that firms are under-leveraged consistently. Therefore, there must be more to this capital structure story
Take a look at an example of a Debenture Prospectus for Raízen S.A - access here
Read more about the dispute between BTG Pactual and Americanas S.A on an accelerated repayment agreement close to when news about the firm’s accounting inconsistencies became public - access here
Important
Practice using the following links: